THE SOCIAL REQUISITES OF DEMOCRACY RE VISITED
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In this paper I discuss the factors and processes affecting the prospects for the institutionalization of democracy throughout the world. I survey cultural and economic variables, religious traditions, various electoral systems, the importance of a participatory civil society, and the methods through which political parties should be structured to maintain stability. I conclude that, because new democracies have low levels of legitimacy, there is a need for considerable caution about the long-term prospects for their stability. In many countries during the 1980s and early 1990s, political democratization occurred at the same time as a profound economic crises. Such conditions have already caused the breakdown of democratization in a number of countries. To attain legitimacy, what new democracies need above all is efficacy, particularly in the economic arena, but also in the polity. If they can take the high road to economic development, they can keep their political houses in order. The opposite is true as well: Governments that defy the elementary laws of supply and demand will fail to develop and will not institutionalize genuinely democratic systems.

The recent expansion of democracy, what Huntington (1991) has called "the third wave," began in the mid-1970s in Southern Europe. Then, in the early and mid-1980s, it spread to Latin America and to Asian countries like Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, and then in the late 1980s and early 1990s to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Not long ago, the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations had authoritarian systems. As of the end of 1993, over half, 107 out of 186 countries, have competitive elections and various guarantees of political and individual rights—that is more than twice the number two decades earlier in 1970 (Karatnycky 1994:6; Freedom Review 1993:3-4, 10). Democracy is weakest in Islamic countries (where, as I will discuss later, few nations are democratic) and in parts of Africa. However, though not fully democratic, "more than 30 African countries are in the process of transition from an authoritarian civilian or military government to one that is more pluralistic" (Schneidman 1992:1; Diamond 1992b: 38-39; Diamond, 1993b:3-4). The move toward democracy is not a simple one. Countries that previously have had authoritarian regimes may find it difficult to set up a legitimate democratic system, since their traditions and beliefs may be incompatible with the workings of democracy.

In his classic work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter (1950) defined democracy as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 250).¹ This definition is quite broad and my discussion here cannot hope to investigate it exhaustively.² Instead, I focus here on such things as cultural and economic variables, the debate about electoral systems, constitutional arrangements (e.g., presidents vs. parliaments),

the importance of a participatory civil society, and the methods through which political parties should be structured to set up and maintain stability—in short, the factors and processes affecting the prospects for the institutionalization of democracy.

HOW DOES DEMOCRACY ARISE?

Politics in Impoverished Countries

In discussing democracy, I want to clarify my biases and assumptions at the outset. I agree with the basic concerns of the founding fathers of the United States—that government, a powerful state, is to be feared (or suspected, to use the lawyer’s term), and that it is necessary to find means to control governments through checks and balances. In our time, as economists have documented, this has been particularly evident in low-income nations. The “Kuznets curve” (Kuznets 1955; 1963; 1976), although still debated, indicates that when a less developed nation starts to grow and urbanize, income distribution worsens, but then becomes more equitable as the economy industrializes (Olson 1963; Weede and Tiefenbach 1981; Todaro 1981:134; Bollen and Jackman 1985b; Muller 1988; Chan 1989; Weede 1993). Before development, the class income structure resembles an elongated pyramid, very fat at the bottom, narrowing or thin toward the middle and top (Lipset 1981:51). Under such conditions, the state is a major, usually the most important, source of capital, income, power and status. This is particularly true in statist systems, but also characterizes many so-called free market economies. For a person or governing body to be willing to give up control because of an election outcome is astonishing behavior, not normal, not on the surface a “rational choice,” particularly in new, less stable, less legitimate polities.

Marx frequently noted that intense inequality is associated with scarcity, and therefore that socialism, which he believed would be an egalitarian and democratic system with a politically weak state, could only occur under conditions of abundance (Marx 1958:8–9). To try to move toward socialism under conditions of material scarcity would result in sociologi-

3 These generalizations do not apply to the East Asian NICS, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.

cal abortions and in repression. The Communists proved him correct. Weffort (1992), a Brazilian scholar of democracy, has argued strongly that, although “the political equality of citizens, . . . is . . . possible in societies marked by a high degree of [economic] inequality,” the contradiction between political and economic inequality “opens the field for tensions, institutional distortions, instability, and recurrent violence . . . [and may prevent] the consolidation of democracy” (p. 22) Contemporary social scientists find that greater affluence and higher rates of well-being have been correlated with the presence of democratic institutions (Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993:156–58; see also Diamond 1992a). Beyond the impact of national wealth and economic stratification, contemporary social scientists also agree with Toqueville’s analysis, that social equality, perceived as equality of status and respect for individuals regardless of economic condition, is highly conducive for democracy (Toqueville 1976: vol. 2, 162–216; Lipset 1981:439–50; Dahl 1971:85–104; Sartori 1987:343–345; Dogan 1988:11–12). But as Weffort (1992) emphasized, “such a ‘minimal’ social condition is absent from many new democracies, . . . [which can] help to explain these countries’ typical democratic instability” (p. 18).

The Economy and the Polity

In the nineteenth century, many political theorists noted the relationship between a market economy and democracy (Lipset 1992: 2). As Glassman (1991) has documented, “Marxists, classical capitalist economists, even monarchists accepted the link between industrial capitalism and parliamentary democracy” (p. 65). Such an economy, including a substantial independent peasantry, produces a middle class that can stand up against the state and provide the resources for independent groups, as many twentieth century scholars such as Weber (1906:346 ff), Schumpeter (1950), Moore (1966), Skocpol (1979), and Berger (1986; 1992) have also concluded. Schumpeter (1950) held that, “modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process” (p. 297). Moore (1966), noting his agreement with the Marxists, concluded, “No bourgeois, no democracy” (p. 418).

Berger (1992), from the conservative side, noted that while there “has been no case of po-
itical democracy that has not been a market economy, . . . [t]here have been numerous cases of nondemocratic market economies" (p. 9). That is, capitalism has been a necessary, but not sufficient condition (Diamond 1993a). As reported earlier (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988:xxi), those democracies “most advanced in their capitalist development (size of market sector of the economy, autonomy of their entrepreneurial class) are also those that have been most exposed to pressures for democracy.”

Waisman (1992:140–55), seeking to explain why some capitalist societies, particularly in Latin America, have not been democratic, has suggested that private ownership of the means of production is not enough to foster democracy. He has argued that a strong market economy is necessary. Where the state limits the market, where it fosters autarchy (a self-sufficient economy that limits competition), it spawns authoritarianism. A free market needs democracy and vice versa.

But while the movement toward a market economy and the growth of an independent middle-class have weakened state power and enlarged human rights and the rule of law, it has been the working class, particularly in the West, that has demanded the expansion of suffrage and the rights of parties (Therborn 1977; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992: 59, 97–98, 140–43). As John Stephens (1993) noted, “Capitalist development is associated with the rise of democracy in part because it is associated with a transformation of the class structure strengthening the working class” (p. 438).

Corruption, a major problem of governance, is inherent in systems built on poverty (Klitgaard 1991:86–98). The state must allocate resources it controls, such as jobs, contracts, and investment capital. When the state is poor, it emphasizes particularistic, personalistic criteria. The elimination of personal “networking” on resources controlled or influenced by the state is obviously impossible. Formulating laws and norms to reduce the impact of personal networks, rules that require the application of impersonal meritocratic standards, is desirable; but doing so has taken a long time to institutionalize in the now-wealthy countries, and has usually gone against the traditions and needs of people in less affluent ones. Hence, as Jefferson, Madison, and others argued in the late eighteenth century, the less the state has to do the better; the fewer economic resources the state can directly control, the greater the possibilities for a free polity.

Therefore, a competitive market economy can be justified sociologically and politically as the best way to reduce the impact of nepotistic networks. The wider the scope of market forces, the less room there will be for rent-seeking by elites with privileged access to state power and resources. Beyond limiting the power of the state, however, standards of propriety should be increased in new and poor regimes, and explicit objective standards should be applied in allocating aid, loans, and other sources of capital from outside the state. Doing this, of course, would be facilitated by an efficient civil service selected by meritocratic standards. It took many decades for civil service reforms to take hold in Britain, the United States, and various European countries (Johnston 1991:53–56). To change the norms and rules in contemporary impoverished countries will not be achieved easily, although South Korea appears unique in having done so in a relatively short period (Seung-Soo 1992; Macdonald 1992).

The Centrality of Political Culture

Democracy requires a supportive culture, the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites of principles underlying freedom of speech, media, assembly, religion, of the rights of opposition parties, of the rule of law, of human rights, and the like (Almond 1956:34–42; Pye 1965:3–26; Dahl 1971:1–16; Bobbio 1987: 63–78; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1990:16–18). Such norms do not evolve overnight. Attempts to move from authoritarianism to democracy have failed after most upheavals from the French Revolution in 1789 to the February Revolution in Russia in 1917, from those in most new nations in Latin America in the nineteenth century to those in Africa and Asia after World War II. Linz (1988) and Huntington (1991) noted that the two previous waves of democratization were followed by “reverse waves” which witnessed the revival of authoritarianism. “Only four of the seventeen countries that adopted democratic institutions between 1915 and 1931 maintained them throughout the 1920s and 1930s. . . .”
world in 1958 had become authoritarian by the mid-1970s" (Huntington 1991:17–21).

These experiences do not bode well for the current efforts in the former Communist states of Eastern Europe or in Latin America and Africa. And the most recent report by Freedom House concludes: "As 1993 draws to a close, freedom around the world is in retreat while violence, repression, and state control are on the increase. The trend marks the first increase in five years . . ." (Karatzyncky 1994:4). A "reverse wave" in the making is most apparent in sub-Saharan Africa, where "9 countries showed improvement while 18 registered a decline" (p. 6). And in Russia, a proto-fascist movement led all other parties, albeit with 24 percent of the vote, in the December 1993 elections, while the Communists and their allies secured over 15 percent.

Almost everywhere that the institutionalization of democracy has occurred, the process has been a gradual one in which opposition and individual rights have emerged in the give and take of politics, (Sklar 1987:714). As I, and my then-students Martin Trow and James Coleman, wrote almost 40 years ago:

Democratic rights have developed in societies largely through the struggles of various groups—class, religious, sectional, economic, professional, and so on—against one another and against the group which controls the state. Each interest group may desire to carry out its own will, but if no one group is strong enough to gain complete power, the result is the development of tolerance. In large measure the development of the concept of tolerance, of recognition of the rights of groups with whom one disagrees to compete for adherents or power, arose out of conflicts among strong and indestructible groups in different societies. There were a number of processes through which tolerance became legitimate. In some situations groups such as the Catholic and the Protestant churches attempted to destroy the opposing faction, but finally recognized that the complete victory of one group was impossible or could occur only at the risk of destroying the very fabric of society. In these conflicts minority or opposition groups developed a democratic ideology, an insistence on specific minority rights, as a means of legitimating their own right to exist. These groups might then force the dominant power group to grant these rights in order to prevent a revolutionary upsurge or achieve power themselves. For them to reject their own program may then mean a considerable loss of support from adherents who have come to hold the democratic values. (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956:15–16)

As a result, democratic systems developed gradually, at first with suffrage, limited by and linked to property and/or literacy. Elites yielded slowly in admitting the masses to the franchise and in tolerating and institutionalizing opposition rights (Almond and Verba 1963:7–8; Rustow 1970:357). As Dahl (1971:36–37) has emphasized, parties such as the Liberals and Conservatives in nineteenth-century Europe, formed for the purpose of securing a parliamentary majority rather than to win the support of a mass electorate, were not pressed to engage in populist demagoguery.

Comparative politics suggest that the more the sources of power, status and wealth are concentrated in the state, the harder it is to institutionalize democracy. Under such conditions the political struggle tends to approach a zero-sum game in which the defeated lose all. The greater the importance of the central state as a source of prestige and advantage, the less likely it is that those in power—or the forces of opposition—will accept rules of the game that institutionalize party conflict and could result in the turnover of those in office. Hence, once again it may be noted, the chances for democracy are greatest where, as in the early United States and to a lesser degree in other Western nations, the interaction between politics and economy is limited and segmented. In Northern Europe, democratization let the monarchy and the aristocracy retain their elite status, even though their powers were curtailed.

In the United States, the central state was not a major source of privilege for the first half-century or more, and those at the center thus could yield office easily.

Democracy has never developed anywhere by plan, except when it was imposed by a democratic conqueror, as in post-World War II Germany and Japan. From the United States to Northern Europe, freedom, suffrage, and the rule of law grew in a piecemeal, not in a planned, fashion. To legitimate themselves, governmental parties, even though they did not like it, ultimately had to recognize the right of oppositions to exist and compete freely. Almost all the heads of young democracies, from John Adams and Thomas Jefferson to Indira Gandhi, attempted to suppress their opponents. As noted before, most new democracies are soon overthrown, as in France prior to 1871, in various parts of Europe after 1848, in Eastern, Central and Southern Europe after World War I,
and repeatedly in Latin America and Africa. Democratic successes have reflected the varying strengths of minority political groups and lucky constellations, as much or more than commitments by new office holders to the democratic process.

Cross-national historical evaluations of the correlates of democracy have found that cultural factors appear even more important than economic ones (Lipset et al. 1993:168–70; see also Huntington 1991:298–311). Dahl (1970: 6), Kennan (1977:41–43), and Lewis (1993: 93–94) have emphasized that the first group of countries that became democratic in the nineteenth century (about 20 or so) were Northwest European or settled by Northwest Europeans. “The evidence has yet to be produced that it is the natural form of rule for peoples outside these narrow perimeters” (Kennan 1977:41–43). Lewis (1993), an authority on the Middle East, has reiterated Kennan’s point: “No such [democratic] system has originated in any other cultural tradition; it remains to be seen whether such a system transplanted and adapted in another culture can long survive” (pp. 93–94).

More particularly, recent statistical analyses of the aggregate correlates of political regimes have indicated that having once been a British colony is the variable most highly correlated with democracy (Lipset et al. 1993:168). As Weiner (1987) has pointed out, beyond the experiences in the Americas and Australasia in the nineteenth century, “every country with a population of at least 1 million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) that has emerged from colonial rule and has had a continuous democratic experience is a former British colony” (p. 20). The factors underlying this relationship are not simple (Smith 1978). In the British/non-British comparison, many former British colonies, such as those in North America before the revolution or India and Nigeria in more recent times, had elections, parties, and the rule of law before they became independent. In contrast, the Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, and Belgian colonies, and former Soviet-controlled countries did not allow for the gradual incorporation of “out groups” into the polity. Hence democratization was much more gradual and successful in the ex-British colonies than elsewhere; their pre-independence experiences were important as a kind of socialization process and helped to ease the transition to freedom.

Religious Tradition

Religious tradition has been a major differentiating factor in transformations to democracy (Huntington 1993:25–29). Historically, there have been negative relationships between democracy and Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and Confucianism; conversely Protestantism and democracy have been positively interlinked. These differences have been explained by (1) the much greater emphasis on individualism in Protestantism and (2) the traditionally close links between religion and the state in the other four religions. Toqueville (1975) and Bryce (1901) emphasized that democracy is furthered by a separation of religious and political beliefs, so that political stands are not required to meet absolute standards set down by the church.

Scholars from Toqueville’s time to the mid-1970s have observed that, among European countries and their overseas offspring, Protestant countries have been more likely to give rise to democratic regimes than Catholic ones (Lipset 1981:57–58; Lipset [1970]1988: 90; Bollen 1979:83; Huntington 1991:79–82). Pierre Trudeau (1960), writing as a political scientist in the late fifties, noted that Catholics have been closely linked to the state, adhering to a church which has been hierarchical, and “authoritarian in spiritual matters, and since the dividing line between the spiritual and the temporal may be very fine or even confused, they are often disinclined to seek solution in temporal affairs through the mere counting of heads” (p. 245). Protestants, particularly the non–state-related sects, have been less authoritarian, more congregational, participatory, and individualistic. Catholic countries, however, have contributed significantly to the third wave of democratization during the 1970s and 1980s, reflecting “the major changes in the doctrine, appeal, and social and political commitments of the Catholic Church that occurred... in the 1960s and 1970s” (Huntington 1991:281, 77–85). The changes that have occurred are primarily a result of the delegitimation of so-called ultra-rightist or clerical fascism in Catholic thought and poli-
Catholic thought and politics, an outgrowth of the defeat of fascism in Europe, and considerable economic growth in many major Catholic lands in post-war decades, countries such as Italy, Spain, Quebec, Brazil, and Chile.

Conversely, Moslem (particularly Arab) states have not taken part in the third wave of democratization. Almost all remain authoritarian. Growth of democracy in the near future in most of these countries is doubtful because “notions of political freedom are not held in common...; they are alien to Islam” (Vatikiotis 1988:118). As Wright (1992) has stated, Islam “offers not only a set of spiritual beliefs, but a set of rules by which to govern society” (p. 133). Gellner (1991) noted that “Muslim societies in the modern world present a picture which is virtually a mirror image of Marxist ones. They are suffused with faith, indeed they suffer from a plethora of it...” (p. 506). In elaborating on the past and present relationship of Moslem beliefs to the polity, Lewis (1993) noted:

The Islamic state was in principle a theocracy—not in the Western sense of a state ruled by the Church and the clergy, but in the more literal sense of a polity ruled by God. In principle, the state was God’s state, ruling over God’s people; the law was God’s law. Not surprisingly, the history of Islamic states is one of almost unrelieved autocracy. (pp. 96, 98)

Kazancigil (1991) has offered parallel explanations of the weakness of democracy in Islam with those for Orthodox Christian lands as flowing from their failures “to dissociate the religious from the political spheres” (p. 345). In Eastern Europe, particularly Russia, the Orthodox Church has closely linked the two. As Guroff and Guroff (1993) emphasized: “The Church has always been an organ of the Russian state, both under the Tsar and under the Soviet Union. Neither in Tsarist Russia, nor in the Soviet Union has the Orthodox Church played an active role in the protection of human rights or religious tolerance” (pp. 10–11).

Noting that in Confucian China “no church or cultural organization...existed independently of the state” (p. 25), and that “Islam has emphasized the identity between the religious and political communities,” Eisenstadt (1968) stressed the resultant “important similarity between the Chinese and Islamic societies” (p. 27). Huntington (1993) reported that “no scholarly disagreement exists regarding the proposition that traditional Confucianism was either undemocratic or antidemocratic” (p. 15; see also Whyte 1992:60). Lucian Pye (1968; see also Pye with Pye 1985) has pointed to the similarities between Confucian and Communist beliefs about “authority’s rights to arrogance...both have been equally absolute...upholding the monopolies of officialdom...It is significant that...both Confucianism and Maoism in ideological content, have explicitly stressed the problems of authority and order” (Pye 1968:16). Though somewhat less pessimistic, He Baogang’s (1992) evaluation of cultural factors in mainland China concluded that “evidence reveals that the antidemocratic culture is currently stronger than the factors related to a democratic one” (p. 134). Only Japan, the most diluted Confucian country, “had sustained experience with democratic government prior to 1990...[although its] democracy was the product of an American presence” (Huntington 1991:15). The others—Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and Taiwan—were autocratic. As in the other less democratic cultures, “Confucianism merged society and the state and provided no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions at the national level” (p. 301). The situation, of course, has changed in recent years in response to rapid economic growth, reflecting the ways in which economic changes can impact on the political system undermining autocracy.

But India, a Hindu country that became democratic prior to industrialization, is different:

The most salient feature of Indian civilization, from the point of view of our discussion, is that it is probably the only complete, highly differentiated civilization which throughout history has maintained its cultural identity without being tied to a given political framework...to a much greater degree than in many other historical imperial civilizations politics were conceived in secular forms...Because of the relative dissociation between the cultural and the political order, the process of modernization could get underway in India without being hampered by too specific a traditional-cultural orientation toward the political sphere. (Eisenstadt 1968:32)

These generalizations about culture do not augur well for the future of the third wave of democracy in the former Communist coun-
tries. The Catholic Church played a substantial role in Poland's move away from Soviet Communism. But as noted previously, historically deeply religious Catholic areas have not been among the most amenable to democratic ideas. Poland is now troubled by conflicts flowing from increasing Church efforts to affect politics in Eastern Europe even as it relaxes its policies in Western Europe and most of the Americas. Orthodox Christianity is hegemonic in Russia and Belarus. The Ukraine is dominated by both the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. And fascists and Communists are strong in Russia and the Ukraine. Moslems are a significant group in the Central Asian parts of the former Soviet Union, the majority in some—these areas are among the consistently least democratic of the successor Soviet states. Led by the Orthodox Serbians, but helped by Catholic Croats and Bosnian Moslems, the former Yugoslavia is being torn apart along ethnic and religious lines with no peaceful, much less democratic, end in sight. We are fooling ourselves if we ignore the continuing dysfunctional effects of a number of cultural values and the institutions linked to them. But belief systems change; and the rise of capitalism, a large middle class, an organized working class, increased wealth, and education are associated with secularism and the institutions of civil society which help create autonomy for the state and facilitate other preconditions for democracy. In recent years, nowhere has this been more apparent than in the economically successful Confucian states of East Asia—states once thought of as nearly hopeless candidates for both development and democracy. Tu (1993) noted their totally "unprecedented dynamism in democratization and marketization. Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan all successfully conducted national elections in 1992, clearly indicating that democracy in Confucian societies is not only possible but also practical" (p. viii). Nathan and Shi (1993), reporting on "the first scientifically valid national sample survey done in China on political behavior and attitudes," stated: "When compared to residents of some of the most stable, long-established democracies in the world, the Chinese population scored lower on the variables we looked at, but not so low as to justify the conclusion that democracy is out of reach" (p. 116). Surveys which have been done in Russia offer similar positive conclusions (Gibson and Duch 1993), but the December, 1993 election in which racist nationalists and pro-Communists did well indicate much more is needed. Democracy is not taking root in much of the former Soviet Union, the less industrialized Moslem states, nor many nations in Africa. The end is not in sight for many of the efforts at new democracies; the requisite cultural changes are clearly not established enough to justify the conclusion that the "third wave" will not be reversed. According to the Freedom House survey, during 1993 there were "42 countries registering a decline in their level of freedom [political rights and civil liberties] and 19 recording gains" (Karatnycky 1994:5).5

INSTITUTIONALIZATION

New democracies must be institutionalized, consolidated, and become legitimate. They face many problems, among which are creating a growing and more equalitarian economy; reducing the tensions with, and perhaps replacing, the old civil and military elites; and formulating workable democratic electoral and administrative systems, that rest on stable political parties (Linz and Stepan 1989; Whitehead 1989; Di Palma 1990:44–108; Huntington 1991:208–79). To deal with all the issues inherent in the institutionalization of democracy requires a book, so I limit myself here to: legitimacy, executive and electoral systems, civil society and political parties, and finally, the rule of law and economic order.

Legitimacy

Political stability in democratic systems cannot rely on force. The alternative to force is legitimacy, an accepted systemic "title to rule."6 Most of the northern European and British Commonwealth nations, for example, developed democratic institutions while retaining what is known as traditional legitimacy derived from a continuing monarchy. Without these institutions and traditions already present, de-

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5 In the Freedom House survey, a country may move up or down with respect to measures of freedom without changing its status as a democratic or authoritarian system.
mocracy might not have developed as it did, if at all.

Weber (1946), the fountainhead of legitimacy theory, named three ways by which an authority may gain legitimacy. These may be summarized:

(1) Traditional — through “always” having possessed the authority, the best example being the title held in monarchical societies.

(2) Rational-legal — when authority is obeyed because of a popular acceptance of the appropriateness of the system of rules under which they have won and held office. In the United States, the Constitution is the basis of all authority.

(3) Charismatic — when authority rests upon faith in a leader who is believed to be endowed with great personal worth, either from God, as in the case of a religious prophet or simply from the display of extraordinary talents. The “cult of personality” surrounding many leaders is an illustration of this (pp. 78–79).

Legitimacy is best gained by prolonged effectiveness, effectiveness being the actual performance of the government and the extent to which it satisfies the basic needs of most of the population and key power groups (such as the military and economic leaders) (Lipset [1960] 1981:64–70; Lipset 1979: 16–23; Linz 1978: 67–74; Linz 1988:79–85; Diamond et al. 1990:9–16). This generalization, however, is of no help to new systems for which the best immediate institutional advice is to separate the source and the agent of authority.

The importance of this separation cannot be underestimated. The agent of authority may be strongly opposed by the electorate and may be changed by the will of the voters, but the essence of the rules, the symbol of authority, must remain respected and unchallenged. Hence, citizens obey the laws and rules, even while disliking those who enforce them. This happened in post-Franco Spain where the monarchy was successfully and usefully restored, although few, if any, countries today could do the same thing. After World War II, Japan, thanks to MacArthur, made dramatic changes under the aegis of the Emperor, avoiding the error made by the Allies at the end of World War I. Following the first World War, the Allies deposed the German monarchy and supported what became the Weimar Republic. Winston Churchill strongly opposed this action, correctly anticipating that the new democratic system would be opposed by adherents of the old empire and would not command their allegiance.

Rational-legal legitimacy is weak in most new democratic systems, since the law had previously operated in the interests of a foreign exploiter or domestic dictator. Efforts to construct rational-legal legitimacy necessarily involve extending the rule of the law and the prestige of the courts, which should be as independent from the rest of the polity as possible. As Ackerman (1992:60–62) and Weingast (1993) noted, in new democracies, these requirements imply the need to draw up a “liberal” constitution as soon as possible. The constitution can provide a basis for legitimacy, for limitations on state power, and for political and economic rights. Establishing stable legitimacy, of course, takes time.

The postwar democratic regimes of the former fascist states, created, like the Weimar Republic, under the auspices of the conquerors clearly had no legitimacy at their outset. But they had the advantage of the subsequent postwar “economic miracles” which produced jobs and a steadily rising standard of living. These new regimes have been economically viable for over four decades. The stability of these democratic systems is also linked to the discrediting of anti-democratic right-wing tendencies—these forces were identified with fascism and military defeat.

To reiterate, if democratic governments which lack traditional legitimacy are to survive, they must be effective, or as in the example of some new Latin American and post-communist democracies, may have acquired a kind of negative legitimacy—an inoculation against authoritarianism because of the viciousness of the previous dictatorial regimes. Newly independent countries that are post-revolutionary, post-coup, or post-authoritarian regimes are inherently low in legitimacy. Thus most of the democracies established in Europe after World War I as a result of the overthrow of the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Czarist Russian empires did not last. In 1920, 26 of the 28 European states were parliamentary democracies; by 1938 only 12 were still free (Mann 1993:2; Lee 1987). As I noted earlier, democratic successes in post-World War II Latin America and Africa were equally poor, and most recently, 1993 has witnessed a considerable decline in political rights in many new de-
mocracies. Beyond failures of economic effectiveness, it has been difficult for these countries to satisfy the many demands stimulated by cross-national reference groups and revolutionary parties. They have lacked the resources needed to win the loyalties of both popular and elite strata, and efforts at created democracy thus repeatedly broke down (Linz and Stepan 1978).

All other things being equal, an assumption rarely achieved, nontraditional authoritarian regimes are more brittle than democratic ones. By definition, they are less legitimate; they rely on force rather than belief to retain power. Hence, it may be assumed that as systems they are prone to be disliked and rejected by major segments of the population. And if they are less legitimate, there will be more resentment, more corruption, and more violations of the "rules." Regimes relying on force, low in acceptance by the population, are inherently unstable and more likely to collapse in the face of a crisis. Even rapid economic success will not keep them going, as Tocqueville noted. Autocracies, particularly in an age of democratic diffusion, face a catch-22 situation: If like in Franco's Spain, South Korea, and Chile, "they do perform in delivering socioeconomic progress, they tend to re-focus popular aspirations around political goals for voice and participation that they cannot satisfy without terminating their existence" (Diamond 1989a:150; Huntington 1968:5, 41). Conversely, if autocracies fail economically, and/or socially, their lack of legitimacy will facilitate a breakdown.

The record, as in the case of the Soviet Union, seems to contradict this, since that regime remained in power for three-quarters of a century. However, a brittle, unpopular system need not collapse. Repressive police authority, a powerful army, and a willingness by rulers to use brute force may maintain a regime's power almost indefinitely. The breakdown of such a system may require a major catalytic event, a defeat in war, a drastic economic decline, or a break in the unity of the government elite. In the Soviet Union, a variety of economic and social data available before Gorbachev came to power indicated enormous weaknesses—declines in productivity and increases in mortality—that suggested serious malfunctions in the system; the size and scope of its secret police attested to low legitimacy (Feshbach 1978, 1982, 1983; Amalrik 1970; Todd 1979). What happened in East Berlin in 1953, in Budapest in 1956, in Prague in 1968, and in Poland on a number of occasions since 1955, could, and finally did occur in Moscow. Now, of course, we know that the most extreme critics were right. And while the situation did not produce a political breakdown until recently, it resulted in highly inefficient and relatively unproductive economies.

In contrast to autocracies, democratic systems rely on and seek to activate popular support and constantly compete for such backing. Government ineffectiveness need not spill into other parts of the society and economy. Opposition actually serves as a communication mechanism, focusing attention on societal and governmental problems. Freedom of opposition encourages a free flow of information about the economy as well as about the polity.

Weber (1946:232–34) noted that an autocrat is often less powerful than a democratic ruler. He suggested that because of the restrictions on freedom of information, the dictator may not know when his orders are ignored by bureaucrats or interest groups that oppose them. He cited as an example the failure of Frederick the Great's land reforms. The Prussian state bureaucracy and local authorities linked to the landed aristocracy simply disobeyed the new laws. And no one told Frederick. In a democracy, by contrast, the opposition and/or the press usually exposes such sabotage.

At least twice in his first few years in office, Mikhail Gorbachev made speeches noting the dysfunctional consequences of one-party regimes. In terms similar to Weber's, he pointed out that the bureaucracy ignored orders and reforms they opposed. He said this could not happen in a multi-party system. He, of course, did not advocate more parties. Rather, he called on the Soviet press and intelligentsia to fulfill the functions of communication and finger-pointing that are handled in democratic countries by the opposition (Gorbachev 1987:R24; 1988:33).

Non-traditional authoritarian regimes seek to gain legitimacy through cults of personality (e.g., Napoleon, Toussant, Diaz, Mussolini, Hitler). New autocrats lack the means to establish legal-rational legitimacy through the rule of law. Communist governments, whose Marxist ideology explicitly denied the importance of "great men" in history and stressed the role of materialist forces and "the people," were
forced to resort to charismatic legitimacy. Their efforts produced the cults of Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Tito, Castro, Ho, Kim, and others. It is interesting to note that the four Communist regimes that experienced large-scale revolt—East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Poland from 1955 to 1980, and Czechoslovakia in 1968—were also the ones with the weakest personality cults, much like the Soviet Union in 1989 to 1991.

But charismatic legitimacy is inherently unstable. As mentioned earlier, a political system operates best when the source of authority is clearly separated from the agent of authority. If the ruler and his or her policies are seen as oppressive or exploitative, the regime and its rules will also be rejected. People will not feel obligated to conform or to be honest; force alone cannot convey a “title to rule.”

EXECUTIVE AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Democracy can be recommended not only on moral grounds, but as ultimately facilitating systemic stability. Democracy enables the citizenry to see the polity as including all societal elements, not only those in power. The electorate becomes part of the legitimating structure. It, rather than the government, holds the ultimate authority. Members of the electorate are encouraged to work for changes in government while remaining loyal to the system. However, efforts to institutionalize freedom in low-income countries face severe difficulties inherent in the fact that new democratic rights encourage demands and actions that destabilize the economy.

As Canadian sociologist Metta Spencer (1991) has emphasized, an equally important concern is “the protection of the rights of minorities from infringement by the majority.” Where minorities, particularly ethnic-linguistic-religious ones, feel they cannot share power (i.e. that they will be “invariably out voted under the conditions of majority rule”), and where they form majorities in prescribed areas, they may try to gain local autonomy or secede as a way of turning a cultural minority into a majority. This has happened in parts of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union (p. 427). Democracies will lack legitimacy in the eyes of minorities who feel excluded from power. Hence, transition to electoral regimes will often destabilize multi-cultural polities, as the situation in many post-Communist states has demonstrated. Calhoun’s (1947) early nineteenth-century theory of concurrent majority and Lijphart’s (1977) contemporary notion of consociational systems suggest similar solutions to this problem. They proposed constitutional structures that give minorities veto power in the policy development process when their interests are affected. Efforts to do this in Cyprus and Lebanon have failed. Switzerland has apparently been successful. Canada and South Africa are currently looking for comparable arrangements. Ironically, Lani Guinier (1993:1589–1642, especially 1625–42) proposes reforms similar to Calhoun’s; however, Calhoun’s proposal aimed to preserve the interests of the masters, and Guinier’s was intended to facilitate the demands of the descendants of their slaves.

Federalism, of course, is the oldest and in many ways the most satisfactory means to manage such conflicts between ethnic or other groups and define regional political boundaries. As Horowitz (1985:598) argued, federalism permits five different conflict reducing mechanisms to operate: (1) taking “heat off a single focal point”; (2) devolving power and office among ethnic lines; (3) offering inducements for ethnic coalitions; (4) encouraging intra-ethnic conflict within provinces, thus allowing for cross-cutting cleavages; and (5) promoting efforts to “reduce disparities between groups.” But clearly federalism is no panacea. It has its failures as well as successes.

Executive Systems

In considering the relation of government structure to legitimacy it has been suggested that republics with powerful presidents will, all other things being equal, be more unstable than parliamentary ones in which powerless royalty or elected heads of state try to act out the role of a constitutional monarch. In the former, where the executive is chief of state, symbolic authority and effective power are combined in one person, while in the latter they are divided. With a single top office, it is difficult for the public to separate feelings about the regime from those held toward the policy makers. The difficulties in institutionalizing democracy in the many Latin American presidential regimes over the last century and a half may reflect this problem. The United States presents a special
case, in which, despite combining the symbolic authority and power into the Presidency, the Constitution has been so hallowed by ideology and prolonged effectiveness for over 200 years, that it, rather than those who occupy the offices it specifies, has become the accepted ultimate source of authority. This constitutional (legal-rational) legitimacy took many decades to develop. Strong secessionist efforts occurred a number of times before the Civil War (e.g., by New England states during the War of 1812, by South Carolina in 1832, and by leading abolitionists in the 1840s who rejected a Constitution that upheld slavery). The Civil War and subsequent long-term economic growth legitimated the American constitutional regime.

Linz (1990a; 1990b) and Riggs (1993) argued that parliamentary systems are preferred because executive power is dispersed within the cabinets among members of parliament who represent different groups or parties in the legislative chamber. Conversely, where power is concentrated in one person, groups with which the president is not directly involved (even within his own party) feel less loyalty to the regime and its policies. Linz has also criticized the rigidity and zero-sum character of presidential systems. He and Riggs believe that the problems inherent in presidential systems explain much of the history of recurrent democratic failure in Latin America and elsewhere.

These arguments are debatable (Lipset 1990a; Horowitz 1990). As noted, many pre-World War II parliamentary systems in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Eastern Europe collapsed. In 1958, Charles de Gaulle, attributed the instability of the Third and Fourth French Republics to multi-party parliamentary systems. These Republics produced short-lived and ineffective cabinets. To change the situation, de Gaulle introduced a complex system with a powerful president who shared power with a prime minister and the legislature. In France, these reforms have resulted in more effective and longer-lived governments. The new Yeltsin constitution adopted in December 1993 attempts a similar system for the Russian Federation.

Evaluation of the relative worth of presidential and parliamentary systems must also consider the nature of each type. In presidential regimes, the power to enact legislation, pass budgets and appropriations, and make high level appointments are divided among the president and (usually two) legislative Houses; parliamentary regimes are unitary regimes, in which the prime minister and cabinet can have their way legislatively. A prime minister with a parliamentary majority, as usually occurs in most Commonwealth nations and a number of countries in Europe, is much more powerful and less constrained than a constitutional president who can only propose while Congress disposes (Lijphart 1984:4–20). The weak, divided-authority system has worked in the United States, although it has produced much frustration and alienation at times. But, as noted, the system has repeatedly broken down in Latin America, although one could argue that this is explained not by the constitutional arrangements, but by cultural legacies and lower levels of productivity. Many parliamentary systems have failed to produce stable governments because they lack operating legislative majorities. For instance, of the seven Eastern European countries moving away from communism, only one, Albania, has elected a majority party. In Poland, 29 parties won seats in the parliament in 1991 (Economist 1993a:5) although the number after the 1993 election was reduced to seven. Prior to the Yeltsin electoral reforms in December 1993, there were 14 organized factions, each with 48 or more deputies in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, plus 199 deputies who did not belong to any (Economist 1993b:59). And 12 are present in the new Duma, plus about 120 independents. Whether these situations will settle down with time remains to be seen. There is no consensus among political scientists as to which system, presidential or parliamentary, is superior, since it is possible to point to many failures for both types.

Electoral Systems

The procedures for choosing and changing administrations also affect legitimacy (Lipset 1979:293–306). Elections that offer the voters an effective way to change the government and vote the incumbents out will provide more stability; electoral decisions will be more readily accepted in those systems in which electoral rules, distribution of forces, or varying party strengths make change more difficult.

Electoral systems that emphasize single-member districts, such as those in the United States and in much of the Commonwealth,
press the electorate to choose between two major parties. The voters know that if they turn against the government party, they can replace it with the opposition. The parties in such systems are heterogeneous coalitions, and while many voters frequently opt for the “lesser evil,” since the opposition usually promises to reverse course, incumbents can be punished for unpopular policies or for happening to preside over depressing events.

In systems with proportional representation, the electorate may not be able to determine the composition of the government. In this type, representation is assigned to parties which correspond to their proportions of the vote. Proportional representation was used in pre-Hitler Germany, pre-fascist Italy, and in much of Eastern Europe during the 1920s and early 1930s, and it currently exists in contemporary Israel, Italy, Germany, Scandinavia, much of eastern Europe, and the Russian Federation. Where no party has a majority, alliances may be formed out of diverse forces. A party in a government coalition may gain votes, but may then be excluded from the new cabinet formed after the election. Small, opportunistic, or special interest parties may hold the balance of power and determine the shape and policies of post-election coalitions. The tendency toward instability and lack of choice in proportional systems can be reduced by setting up a minimum vote for representation, such as the five percent cut-off that exists in Germany and Russia. In any case, electoral systems, whether based on single-member districts or proportional representation, cannot guarantee particular types of partisan results (Lipset 1979:293–306; Gladdish 1993).

CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Civil Society as a Political Base

More important than electoral rules in encouraging a stable system is a strong civil society—the presence of myriad “mediating institutions,” including “groups, media, and networks” (Diamond 1993b:4), that operate independently between individuals and the state. These constitute “subunits, capable of opposing and countervailing the state” (Gellner 1991:500). Forty years ago, my first major effort to analyze “the conditions that favor democracy” (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956:15) focused on civil societies, noting that “in a large complex society, the body of the citizenry is unable to affect the policies of the state. If citizens do not belong to politically relevant groups, if they are atomized, the controllers of the central power apparatus will completely dominate the society” (p. 15).

Citizen groups must become the bases of—the sources of support for—the institutionalized political parties which are a necessary condition for—part of the very definition of—a modern democracy. As Merkl (1993) reiterating Schumpeter (1950) correctly emphasized, “The major device for facilitating the formation of the popular will, its generation of meaningful choices and its impact upon government, have been political parties” (pp. 257–58) Or as Weffort (1992) puts it: “Democracy-building is a process of... institutionalizing conflict” (p. 111).

We owe our awareness of the importance of civil society to Tocqueville (1976) who, in the early nineteenth century, saw in the widespread existence of civil associations the secret to why Americans did so well politically and economically when compared to the European nations of his day.7 He noted that people... cannot belong to these associations for any length of time without finding out how order is maintained among a large number of people and by what contrivance they are made to advance, harmoniously and methodically, to the same object... Political associations may therefore be considered as large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of association... (vol. 2:116)

In their political associations the Americans, of all conditions, minds, and ages, daily acquire a general taste for association and grow accustomed to the use of it... [T]hey are mutually stimulated to all sorts of undertakings. They afterwards transfer to civil life the notions they have thus acquired and make them subservient to a thousand purposes. (vol. 2, 119)

A fully operative civil society is likely to also be a participant one. Organizations stimulate interests and activity in the larger polity;

7 Gramsci, a leading Marxist scholar, writing in the twenties, also emphasized the need for a “dense civil society” arising out of capitalism, which made democratic discourse possible (Stephens 1993:414), as more recently did Lipset (1981:52–53) and Huntington (1984:202–3).
they can be consulted by political institutions about projects that affect them and their members, and they can transfer this information to the citizenry. Civil organizations reduce resistance to unanticipated changes because they prevent the isolation of political institutions from the polity and can smooth over, or at least recognize, interest differences early on.

In a twist on Schumpeter’s (1950) definition of political parties as the basis of democracy, certain democratic values and rights have evolved primarily through conflict among groups in society. Instead of struggling to attain elite political power, various groups—class, religious, economic, professional, and the like—compete with one another and the state for popular attention, for the power to carry out their own agendas. As noted earlier, such opposition groups must legitimate themselves by encouraging the rights of other groups to oppose them, thus providing a basis for democracy. Through these conflicts and their differing ideologies, these groups form an alternative to the state and its control of society.

Totalitarian systems, however, do not have effective civil societies. Instead, they either seek to eliminate groups mediating between the individual and the state or to control these groups so there is no competition. And while by so doing they may undermine the possibility for organized opposition, they also reduce group effectiveness generally, and reduce the education of individuals for innovative activities (i.e., Tocqueville’s “civil partnerships” [1976, vol. 2:124]). In the West, polities are based on a wide diversity of groups that form the basis for parties (e.g., unions, ethnic and religious groups, farm associations, veterans’ organizations, etc.). Fortunately, most of the new democracies outside of the ex-Communist bloc, such as Argentina, Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, and Spain, were not totalitarian and had institutionalized some of the pluralistic institutions of civil society while under autocratic rule (Scalapino 1989). The new democracies must be encouraged to form more of these civil groups. Yet the “newly created” leaders of these interest groups more often than not only have “become . . . [favorable to democracy] during the transition period” (Weffort 1992: 12).

The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, however, are faced with the consequences of the absence of modern civil society, a lack that makes it difficult to institutionalize democratic politics. These countries have not had the opportunity to form the civil groups necessary to coalesce into stable political parties, except through churches in some nations, such as Poland, and assorted small autonomous illegal networks (Sadowski 1993:171–80). Instead, they have had to create parties “from scratch.” Ideologically splintered groups must oppose the former Communists, who have been well organized for many years and have constructed their own coalitions. “Instead of consolidation, there is fragmentation: 67 parties fought Poland’s most recent general election, 74 Romania’s” (Economist 1993a:4). As a result, the former Communists (now “socialists”) have either been voted in as the majority in parliament, as in Lithuania, or have become the largest party heading up a coalition cabinet, as in Poland. In January 1992, the Communist-backed candidate for president in Bulgaria garnered 43 percent of the vote (Malia 1992:73). These situations are, of course, exacerbated by the fact that replacing command economies by market processes is difficult, and frequently conditions worsen before they begin to improve.

Recent surveys indicate other continuing effects of 45 to 75 years of Communist rule. An overwhelming majority (about 70 percent) of the population in nearly all of the countries in Eastern Europe agree that “the state should provide a place of work, as well as a national health service, housing, education, and other services” (Economist 1993a:5). The success of democracy in these countries depends in large part on their populations’ ability to adapt to freedom, to break away from their former views on the role of the state, and their willingness to accept the cyclical nature of the free-market system, and of course, on successful economic performance. Garton Ash (1990), Kohák (1992) and Di Palma (1991) have written eloquently on the persistence of Communist structures and mindsets, as has Hungarian politician and scholar Tamás (1992) when he noted:

All the surveys and polling data show that public opinion in our region rejects dictatorship, but would like to see a strong man at the helm; favors popular government, but hates parliament, parties, and the press; likes social welfare legislation and equality, but not trade unions; wants to topple the present government, but disapproves of the
idea of a regular opposition; supports the notion of the market (which is a code word for Western-style living standards), but wishes to punish and expropriate the rich and condemns banking for preying on simple working people; favors a guaranteed minimum income, but sees unemployment as an immoral state and wants to punish or possibly deport the unemployed. (p. 73)

Political Parties as Mediators

Political parties themselves must be viewed as the most important mediating institutions between the citizenry and the state (Lipset 1993). And a crucial condition for a stable democracy is that major parties exist that have an almost permanent significant base of support. That support must be able to survive clear-cut policy failures by the parties. If this commitment does not exist, parties may be totally wiped out, thus eliminating effective opposition. The Republicans in the United States, for example, though declining sharply in electoral support, remained a major opposition party in the early 1930s, despite the fact that the Great Depression started under their rule and reached severe economic depths in unemployment, bankruptcy, and stock market instability never seen before.

If, as in new democracies, parties do not command such allegiance, they can be easily eliminated. The Hamiltonian Federalist party, which competed in the early years of the American Republic with the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, declined sharply after losing the Presidency in 1800 and soon died out (Lipset 1979:40–41; Dauer 1953). In more recent post-authoritarian European polities, early democratic movements that appeared to have mass support—the Party of Action in Italy, the Union of the Democratic Center in Spain which formed a majority government in the first post-Franco election, the Civic Union in East Germany, Solidarity in Poland—were eliminated or declined greatly in early elections. As mentioned earlier, the same pattern has occurred in a number of former Soviet countries. It may be argued then, that having at least two parties with an uncritically loyal mass base comes close to being a necessary condition for a stable democracy. Democracy requires strong parties that can offer alternative policies and criticize each other. Historically, the cross-cutting allegiances of impoverished India linked to allegiances of caste, linguistic, and religious groupings have contributed to the institutionalization of democracy by producing “strong commitment to parties” on the part of a large majority (Das Gupta 1989:95; Diamond 1989b:19). More recently, volatility and decay in the party system has been associated with a decline in the quality and stability of democracy in India (Kohli 1992).

Sources of Political Party Support

Twenty-five years ago, Stein Rokkan and I tried to systematize the structural factors underlying the diverse support base of European party systems. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments (1967), we analyzed modern political divisions in Europe as outgrowths of two revolutions, the National Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. These transformations created social cleavages that became linked to party divisions and voting behavior. The first was political, and resulted in center-periphery conflicts between the national state and culture and assorted subordinate ones, such as ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups often located in the peripheries, the outlying regions. This political revolution also led to state-church conflicts—struggles between the state, which sought to dominate, and the church, which tried to maintain its historic corporate rights. The Industrial Revolution was economic and gave rise to land-industry conflicts between the landed elite and the growing bourgeois class. This was followed by the capitalist-worker conflicts—the struggles on which Marx focused.

These four sources of conflict, center-periphery, state-church, land-industry, and capitalist-worker, have continued to some extent in the contemporary world, and have provided a framework for the party systems of the democratic polities, particularly in Europe. Class became the most salient source of conflict and voting, particularly after the extension of the suffrage to all adult males (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Both Tocqueville (1976:vol. 2, 89–93), in the early nineteenth century and Bryce (1901:335), at the end of it, noted that at the bottom of the American political party conflict lay the struggle between aristocratic and democratic interests and sentiments. The partisan expressions of the four cleavage models obviously have varied greatly internationally (Lipset 1988:227–66, 1985:187–252). They
have been fully expressed in multi-party systems and condensed into broad coalitions in two-party ones like those in the United States or Australia. Given all the transformations in Western society over the first half of the twentieth century, it is noteworthy how little the formal party systems changed. Essentially the conflicts had become institutionalized—the Western party systems of the 1990s resemble those of pre-World War II. The main changes relate to the rise and disappearance of fascist movements and, in some countries, to the division of the working-class parties into two major ones prior to the collapse of Communism. These working-class parties, of course, were much stronger in the post-World War II political arenas than earlier. In recent decades, all the Social Democrats and most of the much-weakened Communists have changed ideological direction, giving up advocacy of state ownership in favor of market-driven economies (Lipset 1991).

Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Western world appears to have entered a new political phase. It is characterized by the rise of so-called “post-materialistic issues, a clean environment, use of nuclear power, a better culture, equal status for women and minorities, the quality of education, international relations, greater democratization, and a more permissive morality, particularly as affecting familial and sexual issues” (Lipset 1981:503–21). These have been perceived by some social analysts as the social consequences of an emerging third “revolution,” the Post-Industrial Revolution, which is introducing new bases of social and political conflict. Inglehart (1990) and others have pointed to new cross-cutting lines of conflict—an industrial-ecology conflict—between the adherents of the industrial society’s emphasis on production (who also hold conservative positions on social issues) and those who espouse the post-industrial emphasis on the quality-of-life and liberal social views when dealing with ecology, feminism, and nuclear energy. Quality-of-life concerns are difficult to formulate as party issues, but groups such as the Green parties and the New Left or New Politics—all educated middle class groups—have sought to foster them.

Stable party-social cleavage relationships recurred in the post-fascist systems, as well as in more recent post-authoritarian democracies like Spain and Chile, but as mentioned earlier, not as yet in most post-Communist “democracies,” with the possible exception of Hungary. The ex-Communists have reassembled as “socialist” parties, while the non-Communists formed a variety of unstable liberal (laissez-faire), populist-nationalist, regional, and religiously-linked parties. The latter lack consistent ideologies or ties to fixed segments or strata in society, social classes in particular. The one traditional basis of party differentiation that seems clearly to be emerging in Russia is the center-periphery conflict, the first one that developed in Western society. The second, church-state (or church-secular), is also taking shape to varying degrees. Land-industry (or rural-urban) tension is somewhat apparent. Ironically, the capitalist-worker conflict is as yet the weakest, perhaps because a capitalist class and an independently organized working-class do not yet exist. Unless stable parties can be formed, competitive democratic politics is not likely to last in many of the new Eastern European and Central Asian polities. There is, however, some evidence of a trend toward consolidation in Hungary and Poland.

THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC ORDER

Finally, order and predictability are important for the economy, polity, and society. The Canadian Fathers of Confederation, who drew up the newly unified country’s first constitution in 1867, described the Constitution’s objective as “peace, order, and good government” (Lipset 1990b:xiii). Basically, they were talking about the need for the “rule of law,” for establishing rules of “due process,” and an independent judiciary. Where power is arbitrary, personal, and unpredictable, the citizenry will not know how to behave; it will fear that any action could produce an unforeseen risk. Essentially, the rule of law means: (1) that people and institutions will be treated equally by the institutions administering the law—the courts, the police, and the civil service; and (2), that people and institutions can predict with reasonable certainty the consequences of their actions, at least as far as the state is concerned. As the World Bank (1991) has emphasized: “The rule of law is a key element of predictability and stability where business risks may be rationally assessed, transaction costs lowered, and governmental arbitrariness reduced” (p. iii). Here,
once again, we see the needs of the polity and economy as joined.

In discussing "the social requisites of democracy," I have repeatedly stressed the relationship between the level of economic development and the presence of democratic government. As noted, a host of empirical studies has continued to find significant correlations between socioeconomic variables (such as GNP, educational attainments, level of health care) on the one hand, and, political outcomes (such as free polities and human rights) on the other. (Lipset et al. 1993; Diamond 1992a; Inkeles 1991; Bollen and Jackman 1985a; Bollen and Jackman 1985b; Bollen 1979; 1980; Flora 1973; Flanagan and Fogelman 1971; Olsen 1968; Neubauer 1967; Cutright 1963).

Some of the countries that have moved toward democracy in recent years exemplify the implications of the economic development model (e.g., Chile, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan). Prior to democratization, they moved up rapidly on economic and human welfare measures. But the relationship between the economy and human welfare is far from consistent (Lipset et al. 1993). The characteristics of the most populous democracy in the world, India, contradict this relationship, as do those of Botswana, Papua New Guinea, and Sri Lanka. The diffusion of democracy to some poor Less Developed Countries in recent years also undermines the correlation, although this has happened in large part due to the end of a bi-polar world—Third-World dictators can no longer take advantage of the tension between the Soviet Union and the West (on diffusion, see Di Palma 1990:15–21).

Clearly, socioeconomic correlations are merely associational, and do not necessarily indicate cause. Other variables, such as the force of historical incidents in domestic politics, cultural factors, events in neighboring countries, diffusion effects from elsewhere, leadership and movement behavior can also affect the nature of the polity. Thus, the outcome of the Spanish Civil War, determined in part by other European states, placed Spain in an authoritarian mold, much as the allocation of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union after World War II determined the political future of that area and that Western nations would seek to prevent the electoral victories of Communist-aligned forces. Currently, international agencies and foreign governments are more likely to endorse pluralistic regimes.

Karl and Schmitter (1991:270–71) argued that the search for democratic prerequisites is misguided. They accounted for democratic transitions by observing the pact-making process of political regimes and parties. Karl contended, "Rather than engage in a futile search for new preconditions, it is important to clarify how the mode of regime transition (itself conditioned by the breakdown of authoritarian rule) sets the context within which strategic interactions can take place because these interactions, in turn, help to determine whether political democracy will emerge and survive . . . ." (Karl 1990:19).

Karl and Schmitter (1991) viewed the analysis of the behavior of elites in constructing pacts as mutually exclusive from the study of democratic prerequisites. I disagree. Social requisite analysis is concerned with the foundations for successful democratic consolidation. Since pacts are one means of institutionalizing democracy, whether they emerge or hold is linked to probabilities associated with the presence or absence of these requisites. As Weffort (1992) emphasized, "The minimal procedural working of a political democracy implies certain minimal social conditions" (p. 18). Thus, it is not necessary to make an "either-or" choice between the study of democratic conditions and pact-building—they are complementary.

CONCLUSION

Democracy is an international cause. A host of democratic governments and parties, as well as various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to human rights, are working and providing funds to create and sustain democratic forces in newly liberalized governments and to press autocratic ones to change (Economist 1993c:46). Various international agencies and units, like the European Community, NATO, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are requiring a democratic system as a condition for membership or aid. A diffusion, a contagion, or demonstration effect seems operative, as many have noted, one that encourages democracies to press for change and authoritarian rulers to give in. It is becoming both uncouth and unprofitable to avoid free elections, particularly
in Latin America, East Asia, Eastern Europe, and to some extent in Africa (Ake 1991:33). Yet the proclamation of elections does not ensure their integrity. The outside world can help, but the basis for institutionalized opposition, for interest and value articulation, must come from within.

Results of research suggest that we be cautious about the long-term stability of democracy in many of the newer systems given their low level of legitimacy. As the Brazilian scholar Francisco Weffort (1992) has reminded us, “In the 1980s, the age of new democracies, the processes of political democratization occurred at the same moment in which those countries suffered the experience of a profound and prolonged economic crisis that resulted in social exclusion and massive poverty . . . Some of those countries are building a political democracy on top of a minefield of social apartheid . . .” (p. 20). Such conditions could easily lead to breakdowns of democracy as have already occurred in Algeria, Haiti, Nigeria, and Peru, and to the deterioration of democratic functioning in countries like Brazil, Egypt, Kenya, the Philippines, and the former Yugoslavia, and some of the trans-Ural republics or “facade democracies,” as well as the revival of anti-democratic movements on the right and left in Russia and in other formerly Communist states.

What new democracies need, above all, to attain legitimacy is efficacy—particularly in the economic arena, but also in the polity. If they can take the road to economic development, it is likely that they can keep their political house in order. But as I have tried to show, the strains flowing from economic growth may undermine democratic stability. As Diamond (1992b) noted in his writings on Africa, comments that apply to much of the former Communist lands as well: “How can structural adjustment [in the economy], which imposes so much short-term pain . . ., be reconciled with democracy?” (p. 41). And some argue that perestroika (economic and social reform) must precede glasnost (political freedom). They contend that perestroika is more possible without the latter, in impoverished lands.

I conclude on a methodological note. Part of my discussion has sought to draw conclusions from the experiences and/or structural traits of democratizing countries that emphasize the correlations between democracy and economic growth and changes in stratification. But as I have noted, there are many other relationships. Given the multivariate nature of whatever causal nexus is suggested, it is inevitable that any given variable or policy will be associated with contradictory outcomes. Huntington (1991:37–38) reports that the democratization literature includes 27 independent explanatory variables. An appropriate analogy is with the field of medicine, where probability statistics based on thousands of individuals cannot tell the physician what to do in a given case. Even our most obvious generalizations concerning the beneficial effects of economic development need not work in a particular country. We know that development efforts, projects that disrupt the life styles and the social relationships of people and change levels of expectation, as a result, may make people vulnerable to recruitment by extremist movements, religious or secular. As noted, Tocqueville (1976) in studying the French Revolution foreshadowed Gorbachev’s experiences in the recent Soviet upheaval, in concluding that a political system may break down precisely when conditions are improving as a result of rising expectations and the undermining of traditional beliefs and loyalties (vol. 1, 6–13).

The profusion of empirical, historical, and comparative work since World War II, and especially the research in recent years, has added considerably to our understanding of the conditions for democracy. There are a number of assertions we can now advance, with considerable confidence, about the structural, cultural, and institutional factors that are conducive to the development of democracy. But specific outcomes depend on particular contexts: on whether the initial electoral and other political institutions are appropriate to the ethnic and cleavage structures of the given country, on the current state of the economy, as well, of course, on the abilities and tactics of the major actors. For example, Washington and Lincoln, Lenin and Gorbachev, Nehru and De Gaulle, each had a profound effect on the prospects for democracy in his time and country.

Clearly then, we cannot generalize by a formula. The various factors I have reviewed here do shape the probabilities for democracy, but they do not determine the outcomes. The record of social scientists as futurologists is not good. Dahl (1971:208) and Huntington (1984), two of the leading explicators of the structural
conditions approach, were extremely pessimistic about the prospects for more polyarchies or democracies prior to Gorbachev’s rise to power. This is very similar to the failure of most Sovietologists to anticipate the collapse of the U.S.S.R. (Lipset and Bence Forthcoming). Whether democracy succeeds or fails continues to depend significantly on the choices, behaviors, and decisions of political leaders and groups.

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